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Abstract  
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above 400 and average schooling attainment cause national income, while the share above 600 
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I.  Introduction 
Eric Hanushek has pioneered the use of students’ average scores on international tests 
as a measure of nation’s level of human capital.  In conjunction with others he has used this 
measure to support his arguments that 1) a nation’s average level of cognitive skill drives 
development, 2) both the share of students achieving a minimum level and the share reaching 
an advanced level contribute to growth, and 3) that it is this level of skill, rather than its average 
schooling attainment or the resources invested in schooling, that determines a nation’s rate of 
growth.  He has made this argument progressively in Hanushek and Kimko [2000], Jamison, 
Jamison, and Hanushek [2007], and Hanushek and Woessmann [2008 and 2009]. 
Hanushek and Woessmann (hereafter denoted HW) [2008] document that students’ 
cognitive skills, as measured by test scores, are extremely low in developing countries, and they 
claim that schools in these countries do not raise students’ cognitive skills “with sufficient 
regularity”.  They conclude that schooling policy in developing countries should change from a 
focus on schooling quantity (i.e, increasing coverage) to a focus on schooling quality, measured 
using standardized tests of students’ skills.   
HW’s argument that the quality of a nation’s schools determines economic 
development has considerable appeal.  It seems obvious that students’ mastery of relevant 
skills must be more important for a country’s future development than the time students spend 
in school.  And since students in poor countries score poorly on international tests, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that 1) the schools in these countries do not provide a quality education 
and 2) that the low quality of this schooling is preventing economic development.  
But although HW’s argument could be correct, Breton [2011] shows that the empirical 
evidence they present to support their argument is not valid.  He points out that HW [2008] did 
not compare average test scores and average schooling attainment at the same point in time 
and that they used students’ test scores from 1964 to 2003 to represent the cognitive skills of 
workers educated 45 years earlier.   When he examines the relationship between these test 
scores, average schooling attainment and national income in 2000, he finds that differences in 
average schooling attainment explain differences in income better than differences in test 
scores.  He also challenges HW’s contention that low scores on tests necessarily mean that 
schools in developing countries are not educating students, since empirical studies consistently 
show that family characteristics are more important than school characteristics in explaining 
test scores.   
But Breton’s empirical findings are not definitive.  Even though he used average test 
scores as a measure of workers’ skills at a more appropriate date, these scores still do not 
represent the skills of workers who have little schooling.  Since these workers are a large share 
of the adult population in developing countries, the test score measure of human capital is 
biased upward in these countries.  In addition, Breton did not control for the endogeneity of 
schooling and average test scores, so the relationships he estimated cannot be considered 
causal.  
HW [2009] provide additional tests to support the empirical results in HW [2008], 
including tests from different time periods and different levels of schooling.  They also 
instrument their test score measures with institutional variables to control for endogeneity.  
They show that their earlier results are robust to these changes.   HW [2011] show that the 
results in HW [2008] are not seriously biased due to sampling error in the student population.   
 But HW’s more recent evidence does not address the principal deficiencies in their 
earlier analyses.  Their additional empirical results still compare average schooling attainment 
and average test scores at different points in time.  And they have not dealt with the principal 
problem with their test score data, which is that they are not representative of the skills of the 
work force.   
 In this paper I present the results of an analysis that remedies the deficiencies in the 
earlier analyses.  First, I estimate the effect of test scores and average schooling attainment on 
income in 2005, so that the students’ scores during 1964-2003 are more representative of the 
skills of the work force.  Second, I use HW’s [2008] estimates of the share of students that 
scored above 400 and 600, rather than average scores, as my measures of students’ cognitive 
skills.  Third, I convert these measures of students’ skills to a measure of workers’ skills by 
excluding the share of the population of working age in 2005 that was not in school long 
enough to have learned the skills evaluated on the tests.   Fourth, I estimate the effect of these 
estimates of workers’ skills on national income and use instruments for test scores and 
schooling attainment to control for endogenity.     
Using these new measures I obtain estimates of the effect of test scores on national 
income that differ in important ways from HW’s [2008 and 2009] and Breton’s [2011] results.  I 
find that the share of the work force with scores above 400 explains differences in national 
income very well, better than average schooling attainment and much better than students’ 
average test scores.  I also find that the share of the work force with scores above 600 has no 
relationship to national income.  Subsequently, using instruments for these measures, I show 
that the share of the work force with scores above 400 and average schooling attainment cause 
national income and that students’ average scores and the share of the work force with scores 
above 600 do not.   
I then examine HW’s conclusion that since cognitive skills are what matter, schooling 
policy in poor countries should change from a focus on quantity (coverage) to quality (test 
scores).  I show that their conclusion is based on an incomplete analysis of the cognitive skills 
problem.  They focused only on the student population aged 9 to 15, which in poor countries is 
a small fraction of the school age population, and they provided no evidence that children who 
are not in school can acquire the skills evaluated on international tests.  I conclude that in the 
least educated countries the most reliable strategy for raising the cognitive skills of the work 
force is to increase the share of students who complete primary and secondary school.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section II I identify the fraction of 
the work force in 2005 that may have skills that correspond to the available test score data.  I 
then present revised measures that are more representative of the capabilities of the entire 
work force.   In Section III I present the income model used to estimate the effect of the various 
measures of human capital across countries.  In section IV I estimate the income model in 2005 
using the various human capital measures.  In section V I examine the policy implications of the 
results.  In section VI I conclude.   
II.  The Cognitive Skills of the Work Force 
Scores on standardized tests are potentially a more accurate measure of human capital 
than schooling attainment because they measure the skills that students actually acquired 
inside and outside of school.  In addition, test scores can provide information on the 
distribution of skills among students who have the same level of schooling.   
But test scores also have their limitations.  First, they measure skills that may not be 
representative of the human capital required for economic production.  Second, they usually 
measure skills at a young age, so they do not include skills acquired in advanced schooling or on 
the job.  Third, and most importantly, they only represent the fraction of the population that 
was tested.  When the tests are conducted in schools, the scores only represent the fraction of 
the population that attends school, and they only represent this population if the students 
tested are a valid sample of the student population.       
HW’s measure of cognitive skills is the simple average of transformed mathematics and 
science scores over all the international tests of mathematics and science taken in each country 
by students between the ages of 9 and 15 during the period from 1964 to 2003.  For some 
countries scores are available for the whole period, but for the majority, and particularly for 
countries with a less-educated population, scores are only available for the period between 
1990 and 2003 [HW, 2009].  
These scores do not measure the capabilities of the work force.  Assuming that the 
typical individual begins work at age 20 and works for 40 years, an average score on a test of 
cognitive skills at age 9 is at best a rough indicator of an average student’s capability to perform 
on the job 11 to 51 years later.  Similarly, the average score on a test taken at age 15 would be 
an indicator of an average student’s capability to perform 5 to 45 years later.   
The implication is that for those countries with scores for the entire 1964-2003 period, if 
the scores over time are representative of the entire school age population and there is no 
growth in the population over the time period, then the average of these scores provides a 
measure of the relative human capital of the work force in about 2010.  For countries with 
scores obtained only after 1990, the average of these scores is a rough measure of the relative 
human capital of the work force in about 2020.   
These assumptions about the representativeness of the scores are at best only 
approximately correct.  Rotberg [1998] has documented that in many countries the students 
tested in the international examinations are not representative of all students.  Especially in the 
tests taken prior to 1990, in some countries only the better students participated.  As a result, 
in the non-OECD countries, the average scores on international examinations are often an 
overestimate of the average student’s level of skills.  In addition, tests at age 9 to 15 do not 
measure skills acquired after age 15, and the population in more educated countries has a 
much higher share of workers with skills acquired after this age.   
But the more serious sampling problem is that in countries that historically had low 
enrollment rates in primary and secondary school, a large share of the workers in 2010, or in 
2020, are very unlikely to have skills comparable to the students previously tested at ages 9 to 
15.  As a consequence, the students’ average test scores in these countries are an overestimate 
of the cognitive skills of the work force in 2010, or in 2020, and in most cases a very large 
overestimate.   
HW [2008] analyzed the relationship between students’ average test scores at ages 9 to 
15 and the rate of economic growth from 1960 to 2000.  Since the midpoint of this period is 
1980, a reasonable test of whether the students’ average scores are representative of the work 
force is to estimate the share of the work force in each country in that year that had any 
secondary schooling.  Students without this schooling could not have been tested at ages 13 to 
15 and are unlikely to have acquired the skills evaluated on tests at these ages.   
Cohen and Soto’s [2007] data on the average schooling attainment of the population 
age 15 to 64 includes estimates of the share of the population over age 25 with primary, 
secondary, and post-secondary schooling and with no schooling in 1980 and 1990.  These 
estimates can be used to calculate the share of the work force in 1980 that did not have any 
secondary schooling.   
Using these data I calculated the share the population over age 25 in 45 countries that 
had no schooling or only primary schooling in 1985.1  I use this share to represent the share of 
the population of working age in 1980 that did not have any secondary schooling.  It includes 
the population over age 20 and excludes the fraction of the population in 1980 that did not 
survive until 1985.  This excluded fraction is mostly the oldest share of the population that is 
likely to have been retired.   
This calculation reveals that in these 45 countries, on average 57 percent of the work 
force in 1980 had no secondary schooling.  Implicitly only 43 percent of the work force had 
remained in school until the ages of 13 to 15 when half of the test scores were obtained.   More 
importantly, across these countries the share of the workers that had remained in school until 
these ages ranged from only six percent to 91 percent.  These data are presented in Figure 1.  
Clearly in most countries HW’s estimates of students’ average test scores are not 
representative of the skills of the work force in 1980.       
 
Figure 1 
Average Test Scores and the Share of Workers in 1980 Represented by These Scores 
  
                                                          
1
 Cohen and Soto’s data do not provide an estimate for 1985.  I use the average of the shares in 1980 and 1990 for 
this estimate.  
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HW’s average test scores are more representative of the work force in 2005 than in 
1980, but in many countries they still are not very representative.   Using the same 
methodology described above and Cohen and Soto’s data for 2010, I estimated the share of the 
work force in 2005 that had no secondary schooling.  These calculations indicate that on 
average about 35 percent of the work force in these 45 countries in 2005 still had no secondary 
schooling.   In Morocco it was 80 percent, in India 70 percent, and in Greece and Spain 40 
percent.  Even in Sweden the workers without secondary schooling still comprised 15 percent 
of the work force.  So in most countries HW’s estimates of average test scores are still a 
substantial overestimate of the skills of the work force in 2005, and the degree of bias across 
countries is far from random.   
These average scores cannot be adjusted to account for the workers who did not stay in 
school because it is impossible to estimate what their scores might have been if they had taken 
these tests.  The scores on these tests are calibrated to maintain a score of 500 for comparable 
student achievement over time, and the variation in these scores is calibrated to provide a 
standard deviation of 100 points.  There is no minimum score because the scores are imputed 
from an array of different tests taken by different students and the structure of these tests has 
varied over time [Martin and Mullis, 2012].      
But there is another way to use the international test scores to measure a nation’s 
cognitive skills.  HW [2008] provide estimates of the share of students in each country that 
scored above 400 and above 600, one standard deviation below and above the standardized 
mean score of 500 in the highly-educated countries.    
HW [2008] argue that these estimates are useful indicators of skill levels because 400 is 
considered a measure of basic literacy in the subjects tested and 600 is considered an indicator 
of exceptional performance.  Importantly, the estimates of these shares in each country can be 
modified to account for the share of the work force that had no secondary schooling in 2005 by 
assuming that these workers would have had an average score below 400.2  This is a very 
reasonable assumption for individuals who left school several years before the tests were given 
in secondary school.  Even if these individuals scored above 400 at age 9, they would almost 
certainly have scored considerably below 400 at ages 13 to 15.  As shown in HW [2008], in 
countries with low secondary school attendance, even the students who were in school at age 9 
typically have low scores on these tests.  The implicit average of these two scores at ages 9 and 
15 for individuals who did not continue beyond primary school would almost certainly have 
been below 400.    
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 Thanks to Michael O. Martin and Ina V.S. Mullis, Executive Directors of TIMSS and PIRLS, for suggesting this 
method to create more representative test scores for countries with a large number of school drop-outs.   
After adjusting HW’s shares to account for the workers without secondary schooling, my 
estimates of the shares of the work force above 400 and above 600 are much lower than HW’s 
estimates of the share of students scoring above these levels.  As an example, HW estimate that 
in Morocco 35 percent of students score above 400, while my estimate for the work force is 
below 10 percent.   They estimate that in Spain 80 percent of students score above 400, while 
my estimate for the work force is 50 percent.   My reductions of their estimates considerably 
increase the difference in workers’ skills between the most educated and the less educated 
countries.  
Figure 2 shows the relationship between GDP/adult and HW’s estimates of the share of 
students with scores above 400 in 45 countries.  Figure 3 shows the same relationship with my 
estimates of these shares for the work force.  In my estimates the correlation between national 
income and the share of the work force with scores above 400 is considerably higher than in 
HW’s estimates, and this change has a large effect on the analysis of whether cognitive skills 
affect national income in section IV.    
III. The Income Model and the Data Used in the Analysis 
I use Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s [1992] augmented Solow model to estimate the effect 
of these measures of human capital (i.e., acquired skills) on national income: 
(1) (Y/L)it = (K/L)it 
α (H/L)it 
β At
(1-α-β)
 
In this model Y is national income, K is the physical capital stock, H is the human capital stock, L 
is the number of workers, and A is a common trend in world total factor productivity.   
Breton [2012a] presents evidence that this model is a complete model of national 
income that does not omit any important national characteristics, and he demonstrates that its 
estimates of the effect of human capital are consistent with micro estimates of the effect of 
human capital on workers’ earnings.  This is the same model used in Breton [2011] to challenge 
HW’s [2008] analysis.     
  
Figure 2 
National Income in 2005 and Share of Students with Scores Above 400 
 
Figure 3 
National Income in 2005 and Share of the Work Force with Scores Above 400 
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Given the high correlation between the stocks of physical capital and human capital and 
the greater measurement error in the measures of human capital, estimates of the income 
model in equation (1) tend to produce estimates of α that are biased upward and estimates of 
β that are biased downward.  More accurate estimates of the effect of different measures of 
human capital are typically obtained using a reduced form of the model in which income is a 
function of the physical capital/output ratio (K/Y):   
(2) (Y/L)i = (K/Y)i 
α/(1-α) (H/L)i 
β/(1-α) A(1-α-β)/(1-α) 
The data on average schooling attainment and average test scores cannot be used 
directly in the models in equations (1) and (2) because these data are not a linear proxy for the 
H/L variable in these models.  The capital variables in the Solow model are capital stocks, which 
are financial measures created from cumulative investment over the relevant historic period.  
[Breton, 2012a] has shown that the relationship between the human capital stock and average 
schooling attainment is log-linear:  
(3) β log(H/L) = γ attainment 
The data in Figure 3 show that relationship between national income and the share of 
the work force with scores over 400 is approximately log-linear, so implicitly the relationship 
between the human capital stock and share of scores over 400 also is log-linear.3  Taking the log 
of equation (2) and substituting these relationships into this equation yields: 
(4) log(Y/L)i = c1 + (α/(1-α)) log(K/Y)i 
 + γ/(1-α) attainmenti + εi 
(5) log(Y/L)i = c1 + (α/(1-α)) log(K/Y)i 
 + φ/(1-α) (scores >400)i + εi
 
These mathematical relationships between income and schooling attainment or scores>400 are 
consistent with the standard Mincerian model of workers’ salaries as a function of years of 
schooling [Krueger and Lindahl, 2001].   
I estimate the regression models for 2005 using data for 45 of the 50 countries that HW 
[2008] used in their analysis.  I excluded four of the countries because Cohen and Soto [2007] 
do not provide data for them.  I also excluded China because the average test score is for 
Shanghai, which is not representative of the entire country.  These 45 countries are those 
shown in the earlier Figures.   
I estimated the (net) physical capital stock in these countries using the perpetual 
inventory method over the 1965 to 2004 period, annual investment rates, annual GDP/capita 
and population data, and a geometric depreciation rate of 0.06.  OECD [2001] provides 
                                                          
3
 I estimated the log-log relationship between income and test scores>400 and found that it is less statistically 
significant than a log-linear relationship. 
documentation for this method.  Caselli [2004] provides documentation for this depreciation 
rate.  The average test score data are from HW [2009] and the student shares over 400 and 600 
are from HW [2008].  I obtained Cohen and Soto’s [2007] data on average schooling attainment 
data from Marcelo Soto.  I averaged the schooling attainment data for 2000 and 2010 to create 
an estimate for 2005.  The income measure is GDP/adult in 2005, calculated from data for 
GDP/capita (rgdpch) and GDP per equivalent adult (rgdpeqa) in Penn World Table (PWT) 6.3 
[Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009].  The annual rates of investment in physical capital (ki) are 
also from PWT 6.3.  The data used in the analyses are presented in the Appendix.  I used data 
from PWT 6.3 rather than PWT 7.0 because the historic data in PWT 6.3 appear to be more 
accurate for calculating physical capital stocks [Breton, 2012b]. 
One serious concern with the income models in equations (4) and (5) is that average 
schooling attainment and the various test score measures may be endogenous variables.  These 
variables are predetermined in 2005, but across countries their value may be affected by a 
country’s level of income, and if so, the OLS estimates of the coefficients on these variables 
could be biased in a cross-country regression.   
Breton [2012a] uses the Protestant share of the population 20 years earlier as an 
instrument for the human capital stock in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s income model.  He 
provides extensive documentation that Protestant affiliation has been consistently correlated 
with the level of schooling across and within countries for centuries, evidently due to the 
Protestants’ emphasis on literacy to enable their members to read the Bible.  In addition, 
numerous researchers have rejected the hypothesis that Protestant affiliation affects national 
income through mechanisms other than schooling [Iannaccone, 1998]      
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the share of workers testing above 400 in 2005 
and log(Protestant share) in 1980 for the 45 countries in the data set.  The data in 1980 
correspond to the mid-point of the period over which the 2005 work force obtained its 
schooling.  The correlation between these two variables is 0.54.  Since the models with two 
variables for human capital require two instruments, in my 2SLS estimates of the income 
model, I also include a country’s latitude as a second instrument.  Latitude is related to 
temperature, which has affected education through the influence of European colonial 
settlement and culture [Bolt and Bezemer, 2009].  I obtained the Protestant share data from 
Barrett [1982] and the latitude data from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
[1999].  The data are shown in the Appendix. 
IV. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between log(GDP/adult) and the 
various measures of human capital in 2005.  The implied value of α, the effect of physical 
capital on national income, is shown to monitor whether its estimated value is acceptable in 
each model.  In a valid augmented Solow model, α is physical capital’s share of national income 
[Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992].  Bernanke and Guynarak [2001] show that across countries 
this share is consistently about 0.35.  
 
Figure 4 
Share of Work Force Testing Above 400 and Protestant Affiliation 
 
 
Columns 1 to 3 confirm Breton’s [2011] results showing that when average schooling 
attainment is compared to students’ average test scores, average schooling attainment explains 
more of the variation in national income and is more statistically significant.   Columns 4 and 5 
examine the relationships between national income and the share of students above 400 and 
the share of workers above 400.  The coefficient on the share of students is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient on the share of workers is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The model with the share of workers above 400 provides 
a slightly better estimate of α (0.33 rather than 0.39) and explains much more of the variation 
in national income (0.71 vs. 0.59).   
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Column 6 shows the results when average schooling attainment is included in the model 
with the workers’ share above 400.  In this model the coefficient on the workers’ share above 
400 is smaller, but it remains statistically significant at the 5% level, while the coefficient on 
average schooling attainment is not significant and the explained variation in national income is 
unchanged.  This result supports HW’s claim that it is the cognitive skills of the work force that 
explain national income, not the time they spent in school.   
 
Table 1 
Effect of Test Scores and School Attainment on National Income in 2005 
[Dependent variable is log(GDP/adult)]  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 43 45 
Log(K/Y) 0.41 
(.33) 
0.51 
(.24) 
0.29 
(.31) 
0.64 
(.34) 
0.50 
(.25) 
0.47 
(.25) 
0.52 
(.32) 
0.51 
(.27) 
0.53 
(.26) 
0.51 
(.25) 
Average Test 
Scores/100 
0.77* 
(.23) 
 0.40 
(.23) 
       
Student 
Share>400 
   1.61 
(.65) 
  0.98 
(.62) 
   
Student 
Share>600 
      5.40 
(2.98) 
   
Worker 
Share >400 
    1.69* 
(.33) 
1.28 
(.60) 
 1.73* 
(.39) 
1.25* 
(.39) 
1.49* 
(.31) 
Worker 
Share >600 
       -0.28 
(3.32) 
4.59 
(3.59) 
 
Avg School 
Attainment 
 0.18* 
(.04) 
0.14* 
(.04) 
  0.06 
(.06) 
    
Post-Second 
Share 
         0.72 
(.77) 
R
2
 .64 .68 .71 .59 .71 .71 .63 .71 .73 .71 
Implied α .29 .34 .22 .39 .33 .32 .34 .34 .35 .34 
Implied γ  .12         
*Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
But a comparison of the results in columns 2 and 5 shows that average schooling 
attainment alone explains differences in national income almost as well as the share of workers 
above 400 (0.68 vs. 071).  This result should not be surprising because the share of workers 
above 400 and average schooling attainment have a correlation coefficient of 0.92.  Due to the 
methodology used to estimate the share of the work force scoring above 400, countries with a 
large share above 400 have a high level of average schooling attainment.   If workers did not 
remain in school until age 15, by assumption they cannot have scored above 400.     
Nevertheless, the difference in the empirical results between columns 2 and 5 is 
meaningful.  If cognitive skills did not matter, the effect of the revised share of the work force 
with scores over 400 would be less statistically significant than the effect of average schooling 
attainment, and the model with the share of workers above 400 would explain less of the 
variation in national income.   
Columns 7 to 9 examine the relationships between national income and the shares of 
students and workers above 600.  In column 7 the estimated coefficients on the shares of 
students above 400 and above 600 are both positive but neither is statistically significant at the 
5% level.  In column 8 the estimated coefficient on the share of workers above 400 is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient on the share above 600 is 
negative and not statistically significant.  These results reject HW’s [2008] findings that a high 
share of high performers positively affects national income.   
Figure 5 shows the relationship between national income and the share of workers with 
scores above 600.  South Korea and Japan have a larger share of high performers on the tests 
than other countries, but they do not have the highest national income.  Students in these 
countries make an enormous effort, which includes intensive tutoring, to raise their test scores 
to gain access to elite schools [Dang and Rogers, 2008].  Although these efforts clearly raise 
their scores, it does not appear that this achievement contributes to economic output.   
Column 9 shows the results for the same model when Japan and South Korea are 
removed from the data set.  The coefficient on the share of workers above 600 becomes 
positive, but it is not statistically significant.  Again the hypothesis that high performers on 
these tests raise national income is rejected.    
In addition to their high share of scores above 600, Japan and South Korea students 
have an average score of 532, which is 32 points above the average international score on these 
tests.  But while these scores are substantially above those in other countries, they are well 
within the increase in scores that normally accompanies continued secondary schooling.   
Juerges and Schneider [2004] document that when 7th and 8th grade students took the 
same TIMSS 1995 test of mathematics, the 8th grade students scored 32 points higher.  Fuchs 
and Woessmann [2006] document that when 9th and 10th grade students took the same PISA 
2000 tests of science and mathematics, the 10th grade students scored 31 points higher.   
Woessmann [2003] estimates that, controlling for other factors, 8th grade students score 43 
points higher than 7th grade students on the TIMSS 1995 tests of science and mathematics.  He 
also estimates that when students in the final year of secondary school in Sweden and 
Switzerland took these same tests, they scored 103 points higher than students in 7th grade.   
 
Figure 5 
National Income and Revised Share of the Work Force with Scores Over 600 
 
 
These examples indicate that students in Japan and South Korea score one year ahead 
of the international mean on international tests, but they also indicate that each additional year 
of schooling beyond ages 13 to 15 typically has a large effect on students’ science and 
mathematics skills.   It seems likely that the observed Japanese and South Korean advantage on 
these tests is temporary, so it does not affect national income.      
In contrast, the graph in Figure 3 shows that increases in the share of the work force 
with scores above 400 contribute positively to economic output up to a share of 100%.  The 
implication is that students who fail to achieve a basic literacy in mathematics and science skills 
at ages 9 to 15 never catch up, either because they do not continue in school or because they 
are too far behind to comprehend what is being taught in class.  
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A potential problem with using the share of workers above 400 as a measure of a 
country’s human capital is that it does not account for skills learned after age 15.  Column 10 
examines whether schooling beyond this age has an additional effect on national income by 
adding the share of the working population with any post-secondary schooling to the model.  
With this addition the estimated coefficient on the share of workers above 400 declines slightly 
but remains statistically significant at the 1% level.  The estimated coefficient on the post-
secondary share is positive but not statistically significant, and overall the explained variation in 
national income is the same.  These results indicate that the share of workers with scores above 
400 fully captures the cognitive skills that workers acquire in post-secondary schooling.  
Implicitly the share of workers above 400 at ages 9 to 15 is a good predictor of the share that 
subsequently pursues more advanced schooling.       
Table 2 presents 2SLS estimates of the same models shown in Table 1 to control for 
endogeneity bias.   All of these models are estimated using log(Protestant share) and latitude as 
instruments for the various human capital measures.   Columns 1, 3, 4, and 7 show the results 
using HW’s estimates of the various student test score variables.   The hypothesis that these 
measures cause national income is rejected in all of these models because the estimated 
coefficient on physical capital is consistently negative.   
In contrast, the 2SLS effects of average schooling attainment and the share of workers 
with scores above 400 on national income in the various models are consistent with the OLS 
results.  The model with the share of workers above 400 provides the best results.  In this 
model the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and the 
implied value of α = 0.35, which matches physical capital’s average share of national income.   
As in the OLS results, the share of workers above 400 and average schooling attainment 
are very similar in their capability to explain income variation in the 2SLS results.  But again the 
model with the share of workers above 400 explains a slightly larger share of the variation in 
national income.  And again when both measures are in the same model (column 6), the share 
of workers above 400 provides conceptually and statistically superior results.     
As in the OLS results, the hypothesis that the share of workers above 600 affects 
national income is rejected in the 2SLS results.  The estimated coefficient on this variable is 
negative with and without Japan and South Korea in the model.  The hypothesis that the share 
of the work force with post-secondary schooling has an additional effect on national income 
also is rejected.   
The clear conclusions from these two sets of results and the consistently higher average 
test scores for students with more secondary schooling are 1) raising the share of the work 
force who previously scored above 400 at ages 9 to 15 raises national income and 2) raising the 
share of the school age population that remains in school through age 15 is required to attain a 
high share of workers with this level of cognitive skills.    
    
Table 2 
Effect of Test Scores and School Attainment on National Income in 2005 
[Dependent variable is log(GDP/adult)]  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 43 45 
Log(K/Y) -0.56 
(.80) 
0.63* 
(.21) 
-1.76 
(2.90) 
-0.31 
(.60) 
0.54 
(.25) 
0.59 
(.37) 
-0.34 
(.79) 
0.90 
(.45) 
0.74 
(.43) 
0.31 
(1.44) 
Average Test 
Scores/100 
1.76* 
(.65) 
 3.80 
(4.41) 
       
Student 
Share>400 
   4.58* 
(1.52) 
  5.96 
(3.85) 
   
Student 
Share>600 
      -6.8 
(14.5) 
   
Worker 
Share >400 
    1.59* 
(.34) 
4.44 
(2.08) 
 3.98 
(3.31) 
4.87 
(5.79) 
9.0 
(22.0) 
Worker 
Share >600 
       -23.2 
(28.8) 
-30.0 
(47.7) 
 
Avg School 
Attainment 
 0.15* 
(.04) 
-0.23 
(.44) 
  -0.33 
(.24) 
    
Post-Second 
Share 
         -25.5 
(74.1) 
R
2
 .39 .67 na .25 .71 .48 na na .12 na 
Implied α -.23 .39 -.64 -.24 .35 .37 -.25 .47 .43 .24 
Implied γ  .11         
*Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 3 presents the first stage regressions for the various measures of human capital.   
In these regressions the coefficient on the instrument log(Protestant share) is statistically 
significant at the 1% or 5% level for all of the measures.  The share of workers scoring above 
400 has an estimated coefficient on latitude that is significant at the 5% level.  These results 
indicate that these two variables are valid instruments for the human capital measures.   
V. Policy Implications  
These empirical results indicate clearly that increasing the share of the population with 
scores above 400 at ages 9 to 15 raises national income when these students subsequently 
enter the work force.  This share can be increased by 1) raising the share of students that 
remain in school until age 15 and 2) by raising the scores of the students that remain in school.   
 
Table 3 
First Stage Regressions for Human Capital Measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Measure Avg Test 
Scores 
Students 
> 400 
Students 
> 600 
Workers 
> 400 
Workers  
> 600 
School 
Attain 
Post-Sec 
Share 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Log(K/Y) 0.84* 
(.18) 
0.25* 
(.06) 
0.05* 
(.02) 
0.25* 
(.07) 
0.045* 
(.016) 
2.57* 
(.62) 
0.07 
(.03) 
Log(Protestant 
Share) 
0.04 
(.02) 
0.013 
(.007) 
0.005* 
(.002) 
0.05* 
(.01) 
0.006* 
(.001) 
0.50* 
(.09) 
0.015* 
(.005) 
Latitude 0.50 
(.50) 
0.24 
(.17) 
0.01 
(.05) 
0.48 
(.19) 
0.024 
(.035) 
2.36 
(1.38) 
0.11 
(.09) 
R
2
 .63 .56 .47 .68 .52 .71 .37 
*Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
HW [2008] argue that schooling policy in developing countries should shift its focus from 
quantity (coverage) to quality (test scores).   But their own summary of the literature indicates 
that in countries with low primary and secondary enrollment rates, this is not a promising 
development strategy.  They state that most of the efforts undertaken to improve student 
achievement in developing countries have been unsuccessful.  
Woessmann [2003] analyzed the relationship between TIMSS 1995 student test scores 
in science and mathematics at age 13 and factors potentially affecting these scores in 39 
countries.   He found that most of the differences in average scores between countries were 
due to family characteristics (education and wealth) and to the institutional characteristics of 
national education systems.  These characteristics are very difficult to change through policy 
interventions.    
In contrast, governments are capable of increasing the share of the population of 
student age that enters and stays in school.  There are many ways to do this, and particularly in 
recent years, most countries have successfully increased enrollment rates in primary and 
secondary school.   Even if the share of students scoring over 400 at ages 9 to 15 does not 
change, the future share of the work force with scores over 400 will increase if more students 
remain in school.  In addition, since student scores are affected by the education of their 
parents, keeping students in school longer is the first step in raising the cognitive skills of the 
next generation.   
VI. Conclusions  
There is considerable evidence that human capital plays an important role in economic 
development.  Hanushek and Woessmann [2008] have argued that it is the cognitive skills of 
the work force that drive this development, not average schooling attainment.  In this study I 
examine whether average schooling or measures of students’ or workers’ cognitive skills better 
explain the differences in national income across countries.   
I begin by estimating the share of the work force that previously scored above 400 and 
above 600 at ages 9 to 16 on international tests of science and mathematics.  I find that the 
share of workers that scored above 400 and average schooling attainment cause national 
income, while average test scores and the share of workers that scored above 600 do not.  I 
also find that the share that scored above 400 explains income differences across countries 
slightly better than average schooling attainment.  But these two measures have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.92, implying that workers obtain scores above 400 by previously remaining in 
school until age 15.   
In addition, there is ample evidence that students’ cognitive skills, as measured by test 
scores, continue to increase if they stay in school until the end of secondary school.   As a 
result, it is clear that a nation’s level of cognitive skills is largely determined by its average level 
of schooling attainment.  Given the difficulty of raising the test scores of existing students in 
poor countries, these findings indicate that the most reliable strategy for raising the share of 
the work force with scores above 400 is to increase the share of the school age population that 
remains in primary and secondary school.   
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Appendix 
Table A-1 
Data Used in the Analysis 
Country TestSc School GDP/A Cap/A St>400 Wk>400 St>600 Wk>600 PostSec ProtSh Lat 
Argentina 3.920 8.55 18478 28067 0.49 0.21 0.030 0.013 0.089 0.025 0.378 
Australia 5.094 13.17 42755 104082 0.93 0.93 0.100 0.100 0.251 0.227 0.300 
Austria 5.089 11.57 39826 114654 0.93 0.93 0.090 0.090 0.162 0.062 0.524 
Belgium 5.041 11.13 38313 106596 0.93 0.72 0.090 0.069 0.249 0.004 0.561 
Brazil 3.638 7.85 12417 15641 0.35 0.14 0.010 0.004 0.114 0.040 0.111 
Canada 5.038 13.19 41996 94158 0.95 0.95 0.080 0.080 0.510 0.280 0.667 
Chile 4.049 10.36 22688 33497 0.62 0.44 0.010 0.007 0.159 0.015 0.333 
Colombia 4.152 7.47 10278 10657 0.64 0.36 0.001 0.001 0.146 0.009 0.044 
Cyprus 4.542 9.30 29349 71613 0.82 0.46 0.010 0.006 0.099 0.006 0.389 
Denmark 4.962 12.26 39595 102287 0.88 0.88 0.080 0.080 0.236 0.938 0.622 
Egypt 4.030 7.40 7808 4787 0.57 0.29 0.010 0.005 0.106 0.002 0.300 
Finland 5.126 11.98 36016 99839 0.95 0.78 0.120 0.099 0.286 0.925 0.711 
France 5.040 11.04 35276 88931 0.93 0.70 0.080 0.060 0.214 0.020 0.511 
Ghana 3.603 5.45 2518 1265 0.41 0.15 0.010 0.004 0.007 0.250 0.089 
Greece 4.608 10.32 29742 77203 0.79 0.46 0.040 0.023 0.201 0.001 0.433 
India 4.281 4.83 4980 4626 0.92 0.28 0.010 0.003 0.066 0.011 0.222 
Indonesia 3.880 7.62 6913 8634 0.46 0.20 0.010 0.004 0.068 0.048 0.056 
Iran 4.219 6.00 12783 23452 0.72 0.27 0.005 0.002 0.056 0.001 0.356 
Ireland 4.995 10.38 48718 101554 0.91 0.69 0.090 0.068 0.230 0.008 0.589 
Italy 4.758 10.68 32406 103127 0.87 0.63 0.050 0.036 0.124 0.004 0.472 
Japan 5.310 12.86 34533 133304 0.96 0.96 0.160 0.160 0.303 0.008 0.400 
Jordan 4.264 10.23 7273 8032 0.66 0.46 0.040 0.028 0.305 0.003 0.344 
Korea, Rep. 5.338 12.84 27287 88384 0.96 0.79 0.170 0.140 0.335 0.119 0.411 
Malaysia 4.838 9.77 24588 33007 0.86 0.55 0.060 0.039 0.095 0.014 0.026 
Mexico 3.998 8.19 15352 27948 0.48 0.22 0.010 0.005 0.142 0.008 0.256 
Morocco 3.327 4.04 7497 8725 0.35 0.07 0.001 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.356 
Netherlands 5.115 11.42 39980 98314 0.96 0.81 0.080 0.067 0.238 0.418 0.581 
N Zealand 4.978 12.29 31287 67056 0.91 0.64 0.100 0.070 0.399 0.355 0.456 
Norway 4.830 12.60 56863 143250 0.89 0.89 0.050 0.050 0.262 0.976 0.689 
Peru 3.125 8.67 8366 11940 0.18 0.10 0.001 0.001 0.202 0.027 0.111 
Philippines 3.647 8.28 6380 7139 0.48 0.30 0.010 0.006 0.200 0.035 0.144 
Portugal 4.564 7.59 23185 75425 0.8 0.28 0.030 0.011 0.091 0.008 0.437 
Romania 4.562 10.50 9761 29363 0.77 0.53 0.040 0.028 0.140 0.058 0.511 
Singapore 5.330 10.50 45778 128041 0.94 0.62 0.170 0.113 0.298 0.026 0.014 
S Africa 3.089 8.09 13901 10557 0.36 0.21 0.050 0.030 0.106 0.386 0.322 
Spain 4.829 9.89 34093 98613 0.85 0.50 0.080 0.047 0.217 0.001 0.444 
Sweden 5.013 11.92 37119 79113 0.93 0.81 0.080 0.070 0.272 0.574 0.689 
Switzerland 5.142 12.65 42257 142869 0.92 0.88 0.130 0.125 0.216 0.429 0.522 
Thailand 4.565 8.01 11175 28358 0.85 0.28 0.020 0.007 0.183 0.002 0.167 
Tunisia 3.795 4.82 12425 14717 0.45 0.11 0.003 0.001 0.072 0.000 0.378 
Turkey 4.128 6.57 9968 16114 0.58 0.19 0.040 0.013 0.065 0.000 0.433 
UK 4.950 13.23 36901 72414 0.93 0.93 0.080 0.080 0.233 0.150 0.600 
Uruguay 4.300 8.67 14571 21503 0.61 0.29 0.050 0.024 0.145 0.019 0.367 
USA 4.903 12.94 52670 112635 0.92 0.87 0.070 0.066 0.445 0.400 0.422 
Zimbabwe 4.107 8.56 3734 10098 0.68 0.28 0.010 0.004 0.072 0.206 0.222 
 
 
